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THE POWER OF STATE COURTS TO ENJOIN FEDERAL
OFFICERS
RICHARD S. ARNOLD*
THE question whether state courts have power to enter injunctions restrain-
ing or directing the conduct of officials of the United States may initially
appear very simple. Since federal law, if constitutionally valid, is always su-
preme over state law, it would seem that federal officials should be free of
interference from state courts. State judges, moreover, have not always had
so much respect for federal law - particularly the federal Constitution - as
they should have. It might be dangerous to concede them the power to frus-
trate that law by willfully erroneous injunctions. And finally, it may appear
fitting that the rights of federal officials be adjudicated solely by national
tribunals free of local jealousies.
These considerations have produced a line of New York cases that deny
the power of state courts to enjoin federal officers. In the most influential of
these cases, Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank,' plaintiff brought
suit in a state court to compel the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to per-
form a duty allegedly required of it by Section 522 of the Tariff Act of 1930.2
The Bank claimed that the state courts had no jurisdiction to control its dis-
charge of duties imposed by federal law. Although the plaintiff had no other
remedy, since the federal courts at that time had no original mandamus juris-
diction,3 the New York Court of Appeals dismissed the suit for want of jurisdic-
tion. State courts, the court said, generally have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
of federal right, but to allow them to control the manner in which a federal
official performs a federal statutory duty would ignore the division between
state and federal governments. In Fox v. 34 Hillside Realty Corp.,4 the
Supreme Court of New York, applying the Arnmand doctrine, refused to ad-
judicate a tenant's claim that a maximum-rent order of the Federal Area
Rent Control Director was invalid under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947.5
A federal district court had already refused to hear the case on the ground of
lack of the jurisdictional amount.6 The state judge regretted this failure of
justice, but was not moved to grant relief:
The plight of these plaintiffs deprived of a review of a determination of
an administrative officer. . . is a most unfortunate but not unprecedented
result of what has become known as administrative law.
7
*Member of the Arkansas and District of Columbia Bars.
1. 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225 (1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942), 55 HAv.
L. Rr-v. 674 (1942).
2. Ch. 497, 46 Stat. 739 (1930).
3. Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 503, 504 (1813) (federal courts have no
original mandamus jurisdiction).
4. 87 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd nere., 276 App. Div. 994, 95 N.Y.S.2d 598
(1950).
5. 61 Stat. 193 (1947), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1881-1902 (1958).
6. 79 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
7. 87 N.Y.S.2d at 353.
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In Wasservogel v. Meyerowitz 8 the Court of Appeals of New York expanded
the doctrine by refusing to decide a claim that a federal housing regulation
was unconstitutional. The supremacy clause, it said, forbids state courts to
pass on the validity of federal administrative action.
In spite of the apparent certitude of the New York courts, the
decided cases on state court power to entertain proceedings against federal
officers are far from harmonious. On the one hand, state court power to punish
federal officers for crime and to enter judgments at law against them is clear;
on the other, the precedents uniformly hold that state courts may not determine
the legality of the detention of persons in federal custody on a writ of habeas
corpus, nor may they control federal officers by the prerogative writ of man-
damus. The injunction cases lie in between these two lines of precedent. In
spite of the cogency of the arguments put forward by the New York courts
and others, I submit that, at least in the injunction area, basic principles of
federalism not only permit, but require, that state courts have jurisdiction over
federal officials. This article will attempt to demonstrate that doctrine hostile
to this jurisdiction is merely an over-reaction to particularly flagrant instances
of state courts abusing their power by not applying federal law in good faith;
that power to grant relief against federal officials is a normal incident
of the general judicial power possessed by all courts, state and federal; and
that in many cases there will be no remedy at all if state courts do not have
this power. I also intend to show that Congress has given ample protection to
federal officers against any abuses of state court jurisdiction over them.
I. THE HABEAS CORPUS AND MANDAMUS CASES
Most of the early cases that contain any discussion of state court power
over federal officials arose out of an effort by state courts to grant habeas
corpus for prisoners or other persons in the custody of federal officers. For
about eighty years after the adoption of the Constitution the state courts con-
sistently asserted this power,9 largely unchallenged by the federal courts. Al-
though there was no general power in federal courts to release state prisoners
on habeas, since Congress had never conferred such jurisdiction, state courts
were courts of general jurisdiction, and the writ of habeas corpus was re-
garded as an ordinary and usual incident of the judicial power granted by
8. 300 N.Y. 125, 89 N.E.2d 712 (1949). Accord, Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village, Inc.,
309 N.Y. 527, 132 N.E.2d 492 (1956); Hunter v. City of New York, 121 N.Y.S.2d 841
(Sup. Ct. 1953) (alternative holding); cf. Lynbrook Gardens, Inc. v. Ullmann, 291 N.Y.
472, 53 N.E.2d 353 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 742 (1944).
9. See Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HA~v. L. REv. 345, 353
(1930) ; Bishop, The Jurisdictions of State and Federal Courts Over Federal Officers, 9
CoLum. L. REv. 397, 404 (1909). There were a few exceptions to this claim of power.
See, e.g., Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9 (1855). Chancellor Kent at first denied its existence,
In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. R. 239 (Sup. Ct. 1812), but later recanted under pressure of
authority. 1 KENT, COMmENTARIES *400-01 (14th ed. 1896). The state cases, including
several unreported decisions, are collected in In re Reynolds, 20 Fed. Cas. 592 (No. 11721)
(N.D.N.Y. 1867).
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state constitutions.10 The power was exercised in some instances of grave con-
cern to federal interests. In 1833, for example, there was an attempt on the
life of President Jackson. A federal grand jury in the District of Columbia
investigating the attempt subpoenaed one Pleasants, editor of the Richmond
Whig, to appear and give evidence. Pleasants disobeyed and was attached for
contempt. He brought habeas corpus in a Virginia state court and was released
on the ground that the District of Columbia grand jury's subpoena could not
run into Virginia. The court reasoned that it had an obligation to protect
Virginia citizens from unlawful restraint.1 '
As the conflict over slavery intensified, however, state habeas power began
to run into determined opposition. The federal courts were anxious to protect
federally guaranteed slaveholders' rights created by the Fugitive Slave Acts
of 1793 and 1850.12 Under the Act of 1793 when a master had seized a fugitive
slave, he was entitled to take him back home so long as he obtained a certificate
of ownership, granted after summary proceeding before a federal judge or a
county, city, or town magistrate. Since the state magistrates had been refusing
to take jurisdiction under the 1793 act and there were few federal judges, the
slaveowner's remedy was expanded in the 1850 act by giving commissioners
of the federal circuit courts power to issue the certificate and by making federal
marshals available to guard the slaveowner and the runaway on their way back
South. But the Act of 1850 did not succeed in removing state-created impedi-
ments to the federal constitutional right. State judges began entertaining
habeas applications on behalf of alleged slaves, and soon fugitives were
being released by state courts on a number of grounds, including the uncon-
stitutionality of the Act of 1850. Typically, when a federal marshal accom-
panying a slaveowner was jailed by the state for disobeying a state writ of
habeas corpus, he would bring federal habeas,' 3 and the federal courts would
then be called upon to decide whether the state courts had power to release
persons from federal custody. The federal courts could have ordered the mar-
shals' release on the narrow ground that the certificates issued by the federal
commissioner, by virtue of section 6 of the Act of 1850, had the effect of pre-
venting interference with the custody of the slave by any court, judge, or
10. General federal habeas jurisdiction over state prisoners was not conferred until
the Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385. One federal judge, in holding against state
court power over federal prisoners, referred to this reciprocal lack of federal habeas juris-
diction over state prisoners. In re Veremaitre, 28 Fed. Cas. 1147 (No. 16915) (S.D.N.Y.
1350). See also In re Keeler, 14 Fed. Cas. 173, 174 (No. 7637) (D. Ark. 1843) (dictum).
Mr. Justice Story described the question as an open one on the precedents. United States
v. Bainbridge, 24 Fed. Cas. 946, 952 (No. 14497) (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (dictum).
11. See Ex parte Pleasants, 19 Fed. Cas. 864 (No. 11225) (C.C.D.C. 1833) (re-
printing, at pp. 864-68, the state court opinion).
12. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302; Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
These statutes were passed pursuant to Art. IV, § 2 of the Constitution.
13. Under § 7 of the Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 634 (the Force Bill, passed
to counteract South Carolina's purported nullification of the federal Tariff Act of 1832),
federal courts could issue habeas to release from state custody persons confined for any
act done in pursuance of federal law.
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magistrate. Instead, they held broadly under the Constitution that when in a
state habeas proceeding it became known that the relator was in federal cus-
tody, the state court's "jurisdiction ceases, and all further proceedings in the
case will be coram non judice."14
The Supreme Court had occasion to settle the matter in 1859, in Abenman
v. Booth.15 In studied defiance of federal law and federal judicial authority
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had twice released on habeas a prisoner in
federal custody on a charge of aiding a slave's escape from a federal marshal.
Then, when a writ of error was served upon its clerk in order to obtain
United States Supreme Court review of the second release, it directed the
clerk to make no return to the writ.16 Such conduct was hardly calculated to
establish in the Supreme Court an attitude friendly to state power. Speaking
for a unanimous Court, Mr. Chief Justice Taney declared that the state courts
lacked power to inquire into the custody of federal prisoners - even where,
as in the case before him, it was claimed that that custody violated the federal
Constitution. The opinion would have been forceful enough had it been limited
to holding that the state court could not defeat appellate review by the Su-
preme Court by refusing to make return on a writ served on its clerk and that
the state court had erred on the merits in holding the Fugitive Slave Laws
unconstitutional. It went much beyond those points, however, and, in sweep-
ing language denied any state court jurisdiction to inquire into the legality
of federal custody. Once the state courts know that the relator is held by a
federal officer under a claim of federal authority,
They then know that the prisoner is within the dominion and juris-
diction of another Government, and that neither the writ of habeas corpus,
nor any other process issued under State authority, can pass over the line
of division between the two sovereignties. 17
14. Ex parte Sifford, 22 Fed. Cas. 105, 109 (No. 12848) (S.D. Ohio 1857). Accord,
Ex parte Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 965 (No. 11934) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1856); Ex parte
Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 969 (No. 11935) (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1855) ; Charge to Grand Jury
- Fugitive Slave Law, 30 Fed. Cas. 1007 (No. 18261) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1851); Norris
v. Newton, 18 Fed. Cas. 322 (No. 10307) (C.C.D. Ind. 1850). Cf. Extradition of Fugi-
tives from Justice, 6 Os. ATT'y GEN. 237 (1853) (state courts have no power, on habeas,
to decide legality of custody by federal authorities for extradition to a foreign country).
Norris v. Newton, supra, appears to go so far as to say that state courts have no power
to proceed in a habeas case once a slaveowner asserts that he holds the slave under fed-
eral law, even though the slaveowner is unaccompanied by a federal marshal, and no
federal officer is a party to the case.
15. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).
16. The Attorney General of the United, States, on whose motion the writ had been
issued, then moved the Supreme Court to allow him to file with that Court a certified copy
of the record in the state courts, and thereupon to treat the cause as docketed just as
though the clerk of the lower court had made a proper return to the writ. The Court at
first declined to take this extraordinary step, United States v. Booth, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
476 (1856), but when Wisconsin's recalcitrance continued for another Term it granted
the Attorney General's motion.
17. 62 U.S. (21 How.) at 523.
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One wonders where the Court found this absolute prohibition. Nothing in
the Constitution takes away such state court jurisdiction. The federal statute
conferring habeas corpus jurisdiction on the federal courts 18 does not say that
this jurisdiction is exclusive of state courts, and, as will more fully appear be-
low,19 the normal presumption is that state court power is not affected in the
absence of express exclusion. It has been suggested that the rule may be found
in "a federal common law of state-federal relations, developed by the courts but
subject to control by Congress."2 Perhaps the answer is that Ableman v.
Booth is merely a special case of the general rule of judicial comity that once
one court has obtained possession of a res and has begun to make an adjudica-
tion with respect thereto, all other courts should decline to interfere. This is the
explanation offered by Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Ponzi v. Fessenden.21 Un-
fortunately, this reasoning does not explain even Ableman v. Booth itself (to
say nothing of some of its later applications). The second release of the federal
prisoner in Ableman came after he had been finally convicted in a federal dis-
trict court - there being no criminal appeal at that time - so that there was
no interference with the federal court's power to dispose fully of the case be-
fore it. On the other hand, if we can forget for the moment that res judicata
is no bar to a habeas proceeding, the case may simply show the Supreme
Court's justifiable reluctance to have final federal judgments thwarted.
Whatever the rationale for Ableman, the case has not been limited to pre-
vention of state interference with federal custody of criminal defendants or
convicts. Some pre-existing authority, it is true, suggested a distinction be-
tween persons held on federal judicial process and persons held merely under
executive power.2 2 It was apparently thought that state inquiry into judicially
authorized federal custody was less tolerable. Most of the state court habeas
cases before Ableman were brought to test the validity of a holding by the
executive, specifically of enlistment by minors in the federal armed forces.
Some courts continued to assert power in such cases even after Ableman.2
18. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81.
19. See text accompanying notes 75-86 infra.
20. HiRT & WEcHsLER, THE FEDERAL CoUaRTs AND TIRE FEDERAL SYSTEm 388 (1953).
See Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with Federal Authorities, 51 Co um.
L. REv. 84, 85 n.12 (1951).
21. 258 U.S. 254 (1922). The "res" principle of priority of jurisdiction, the Court
said, applies to persons, "as is shown by the great judgment of Chief Justice Taney in
Ableman v. Booth ... ." 258 U.S. at 261.
For application of the res principle see, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
450 (1860); Duncan v. Darst, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 301 (1843).
22. See Collier's Case - Jurisdiction of Federal and State Courts, 6 Ors. AVr'Y.
GEN. 103 (1853).
23. For cases before Ableman, see, e.g., State v. Dimick, 12 N.H. 197 (1841); Com-
monwealth v. Fox, 7 Pa. 336 (1848). For cases after Ableman see, e.g., In re Reynolds,
20 Fed. Cas. 592 (No. 11721) (N.D.N.Y. 1867) and cases cited therein; McConologue's
Case, 107 Mass. 154 (1871). But see, e.g., In re Neill, 17 Fed. Cas. 1296 (No. 10089)
(S.D.N.Y. 1871); In re Farrand, 8 Fed. Cas. 1070 (No. 4678) (D. Ky. 1867).
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But in 1871 the Supreme Court resolved all doubt; it solemnly reaffirmed
Ableman and gave it a broad and uncompromising reading."4
Once again the Supreme Court of Wisconsin provided the opportunity for
a sweeping opinion. This time habeas was sought by a father on behalf of his
son, Edward Tarble. Edward's enlistment in the United States Army, the
father alleged, was illegal, since the boy was under twenty-one. The father
asked the state courts to order one Lieutenant Stone, who was in charge of
Edward, to let the boy come home. The Wisconsin court did so, in the face
of Ableman, which had been decided not much more than a decade before.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Field, reversed.25 The
Court emphatically proclaimed that state courts were without jurisdiction to
consider, on habeas corpus, the legality of any federal detention, be it judicial
or executive. Copious extracts were reproduced from Ablentan v. Booth, and
that case was held to be a dispositive precedent. Not content with Ablenman
as a basis for the decision, justice Field embarked on a lengthy dogmatic
disquisition on the principles of federalism. State courts must not be permitted,
he said, to make conflicting judgments on the validity of federal action. He
expressly declined to limit Ablenan to cases in which the state court was
clearly attempting to circumvent a strong line of Supreme Court authority.
The federal and state governments are completely independent sovereignties
- except to the extent that federal courts may be called upon to uphold the
supremacy of federal over state law. State courts cannot interfere with the
execution of federal law - even if that law is unconstitutional. Until some
federal court has declared a federal law invalid, it cannot be called in question
by a state court, at least in a habeas corpus proceeding.
This reasoning, of course, was sufficient to dispose of the case. But Justice
Field went further. The federal government, he said, could never execute its
constitutional powers to make war and raise armies if state courts were con-
tinually setting soldiers free. The fear was expressed that state courts might
embarrass the Government willfully. Nor would appellate review by the Su-
preme Court be a sufficient remedy, since in the period pending the appeal
the soldier might be discharged and the mischief done. Federal habeas could
not be similarly troublesome, since Congress could remedy any such diffi-
culty. No fear need be entertained, the Court concluded, that liberty would
be in danger. The federal courts would be open to redress illegal federal re-
straint.
A number of intriguing questions are raised by Tarble's Case. What if
federal habeas, for one reason or another, were not available ?26 Mr. Justice
24. Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
25. The vote was seven to one. Mr. Chief Justice Chase dissented. He thought state
courts clearly had the power claimed and even suggested that denial of the power might
violate the prohibition, U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, against suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 412. Mr. Justice Nelson took no part. Id. at ix.
26. Federal habeas jurisdiction is the creature of Congress. Ex parte Bollnan, 8 U.S.
(4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807). But cf. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir.
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Field's language indicates that the Constitution forbids state jurisdiction ex
proprio vigore. That being so, would an act of Congress expressly conferring
such power on state courts be unconstitutional ?27 Does the case really rest
on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in the state courts, or is not its true
basis some sort of federal privilege not to be sued in a "foreign" forum? Ponzi
v. Fessenden2 8 is strong evidence that there is no want of subject-matter
jurisdiction in the strict sense. There, the Court allowed a state court, with
the consent of the Attorney General of the United States, to cause a federal
prisoner to be produced before it on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
for trial on a state criminal charge. In spite of these questions, however, there
is no reason to believe that Tarble's Case would not be followed today, should
a state court attempt to review the validity of a federal detention. Though
there may be room for argument as to what constitutes custody "under the
authority, or claim and color of the authority, of the United States," as opposed
to custody "under the mere pretense of having such authority,"29 the basic
principle seems secure.80
The cases in the mandamus area are just as emphatic in denying state court
power. They stem from the early case of McClung v. Silliman.81 There, suit
was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Ohio
for a writ of mandamus to compel the registrar of a federal land office to issule
a deed to the plaintiff. The registrar replied that the land had already been
conveyed to another, and that accordingly he had no power to issue the deed
demanded. The circuit court held that it had no jurisdiction, and the Supreme
Court affirmed on the ground that Congress had not conferred mandamus
jurisdiction on the federal courts, except in aid of some other portion of their
powers. An original suit for mandamus, as opposed to an ancillary motion for
the writ, could not be entertained.32
1949), rez'd on other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950);
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405-06 (1963) (dictum).
27. It may be that § 14 of the Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 560, authorizing
any federal judge or "any court or judge of a state, who, by the laws of such state, are
authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus," to discharge any U.S. Army private arrested
for debt, on application of his commanding officer, did in fact confer such power. This
statute was repealed by §§ 23 & 29 of the Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, 2 Stat. 136, and
I find no record of its ever being invoked. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1958) (state judge may
release fugitive not extradited within a fixed time).
28. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
29. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 410. Cf. Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884) (state
habeas lies against officer of foreign, state having custody of relator under federal inter-
state emxtradition statutes) (In re Robb, 19 Fed. 26 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884), contra, over-
ruled) ; Application of House, 352 P.2d 131 (Alaska 1960) (state habeas lies at suit of
federally convicted prisoner whose case, by virtue of the Alaska Statehood Act, 72 Stat.
349 (1958), has been transferred to state jurisdiction, even though relator is still held by
federal authorities).
30. See, e.g., Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1886).
31. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821).
32. MclIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 503, 504 (1813).
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Whatever the merits of this determination, it dosed the federal courts to
plaintiff. He took the natural step of repairing to the state courts. Those courts
were willing enough to take jurisdiction, but they held for the defendant on
the merits. The plaintiff again sought Supreme Court review. That Court
affirmed the state courts' judgment, but expressly on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The state's assertion of jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Johnson said,
was "an instance of the growing pretensions of some of the state courts over
the exercise of the powers of the general government."33 Congress might have
delegated to the federal courts the power to control federal officers; that it
did not, the Court thought, clearly meant that it desired no court to have that
power. A federal officer "can only be controlled by the power that created
him. . . ."34 The plaintiff should proceed against the defendant federal officer
by an action at law for damages or for recovery of specific property - "the
ordinary mode of obtaining justice" - instead of invoking "the extraordinary
and unprecedented mode of... mandamus."35
It is hard to define the rationale of the case with precision. Probably it
turned on the fact that mandamus is an extraordinary prerogative writ, and
that Congress had not given federal courts mandamus jurisdiction. In stating
the case a few years later, the Court emphasized that "The United States have
not thought proper to delegate that power [mandamus] to their own courts.13 6
And it was apparently commonly supposed that mandamus was a special rem-
edy that ran only from one organ of government to another organ of the same
government. It was once doubted, for example, whether the Supreme Court
could enforce its judgments by mandamus to the highest court of a state, and
McClung v. Silliman was cited in support of the doubt.37 McClung has been
deemed controlling, moreover, when state courts have been asked or have at-
tempted to mandamus federal officers.38 Though one later Supreme Court
opinion appears to ignore it completely,3 9 there is no good reason to predict
that McClung will not govern whenever a plaintiff makes the mistake of label-
ing his papers "mandamus."
33. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 598.
34. Id. at 605.
35. Ibid.
36. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 617 (1838). This
decision modified Mclntire to the extent of allowing the Circuit Court for the District
of Columbia to exercise original mandamus jurisdiction. That peculiar distinction obtained
until October 5, 1962, when Congress finally gave federal District Courts generally orig-
inal mandamus jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. IV, 1963), without expressly ex-
cluding the state courts. Quaere, whether one ground of McClung has not thus been cut
away.
37. In re Blake, 175 U.S. 114, 119 (1899). But see Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57
(1958) (per curiam) (assuming that Supreme Court judgments may be enforced by
mandamus to a state court).
38. See Ex parte Shockley, 17 F.2d 133 (N.D. Ohio 1926); Fischer v. Daudistal, 9
Fed. 145 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1881) (semble) ; Hinkle v. Town of Franklin 118 W. Va. 585,
191 S.E. 291 (1937). But cf. Tuttle v. Iron Nat'l Bank of Plattsburgh, 170 N.Y. 9, 62
N.E. 761 (1902) (per curiam).
39. Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 151-52 (1919).
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It is thus clear, at least on the precedents, that state courts have no power
to issue habeas corpus or mandamus to federal officials. The central issue for
discussion, then, is whether McClung, Tarble's Case, or their principles pre-
vent state courts from using their general equity powers in suits against fed-
eral agents or agencies.
II. ThE INJUNCTION CASES
Authorities directly relevant to the issue of state court power to enjoin fed-
eral officers are not numerous. After Armand Schmoll,4 0 perhaps the most
prominent is Pennsylvania Turnpike Comn'n v. McGinnes.41 The plaintiff
state Turnpike Commission claimed that one of the defendants, Manu-Mine
Research & Development Co., had defrauded it of about one million dollars.
It was further alleged that the fraudulently obtained funds had been paid as
federal taxes to the defendant McGinnes, District Director of Internal Rev-
enue, and that McGinnes was about to refund the money to Manu-Mine as
an overpayment of taxes. If the money were thus refunded, plaintiff claimed,
Manu-Mine would dissipate it before the Turnpike Commission could reach
it. The complaint asked that McGinnes be forbidden to pay the money to
Manu-Mine or its assignee, Seaboard Surety Co., and that he be directed to
pay it over to the Turnpike Commission. Suit was first brought in a federal
court, but it was dismissed for want of original jurisdiction.42 The plaintiff
then went into the state court for the same relief. McGinnes removed the case
to the federal district court on the ground that he was being sued for an act
arising out of his official duties as an agent of the United States.43 He then
moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, and invoked the settled rule that a
federal court can acquire no jurisdiction on removal if the state court had none
to begin with. 44 The motion was granted, and plaintiff was left without his
remedy. The curious result of the decision was that a rule guarding federal
officers from suit in state courts was applied to give them absolute protection
from federal court suit as well.
45
40. See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
41. 179 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiant, 278 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 820 (1960).
42. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. McGinnes, 268 F.2d 65 (3d Cir.), reversing
169 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Pa. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959). The case did not
"arise under" federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958), and reliance
on the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2463 (1958), that "all property taken or detained under
any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed to be
in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof," was unsuccessful because the suit did not
concern any defined res.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1) (1958).
44. See, e.g., Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
45. Indeed, it may well be that the comprehensive federal officer removal provisions,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a (1958), which cover any "civil action or criminal prosecution
commenced in a State court," represent a congressional assumption. that state courts have
jurisdiction of all ordinary civil proceedings against federal officers. On the other hand, it
is only since 1948 that removal has been available to all federal officials - a fact that may
explain pre-1948 reluctance to recognize state court power to enjoin federal officers.
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As the district court in McGinnes properly observed, most cases in point
oppose state court injunction jurisdiction. 4 6 Given McClung and Arnand
Schmoll, it is not surprising that the district judge in McGinnes was unwill-
ing to innovate. There are precedents favoring the state courts' jurisdiction,
however,47 and the Supreme Court has never decided the matter - although
it might have done so had it not thought the question so difficult and of such
"grave consequence. ' 48 Our inquiry need not be so diffident as that of the dis-
trict court in McGinnes.
First, it is important to bear in mind that there has never been any general
rule against state court jurisdiction over federal officers. Those officers are
subject in general to state law, just as every other person within the state's
borders. The cases in which federal officials have been sued for damages in
state courts are legion ;49 the jurisdiction does not even appear to have been
questioned since 1852, when the Supreme Court unanimously upheld it in
Teal v. Felton.50 That was an action of trover in a New York justice court
against the postmaster of Syracuse, N.Y., claiming damages of six cents for
wrongful refusal to deliver a newspaper to the plaintiff. Judgment went for
the plaintiff in the state courts. On writ of error, counsel for the postmaster
argued that such state court jurisdiction "would enable courts to adjudicate
where the legislative authority could not act."' McClung v. Silliman was
relied on as an authority against the state courts' power, but the Supreme
Court did not even bother to cite McClung in upholding the state courts.
Nor has state court power been limited to the special area of damages
an area that might be distinguished as involving no direct interference with
or obstruction of federal functions. State courts also have authority over ac-
tions at law for specific relief, such as replevin and ejectment 52 - actions in
46. See, e.g., in addition to the cases discussed in the text, Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S.
441 (1879) (dictum); Shanks Village Comm. v. Cary, 197 F.2d 212, 217-18 (2d Cir.
1952) (dictum); In re Turner, 119 Fed. 231 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1902) ; Parry v. Delaney,
310 Mass. 107, 37 N.E.2d 249 (1941) (alternative holding) ; State Board of Health v.
Wilson, 188 S.W.2d 999 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
47. See McNally v. Jackson, 7 F.2d 373 (E.D. La. 1925) ; Lewis Publishing Co. v.
Wyman, 152 Fed. 200 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1907); cf. Mallory v. Wheeler, 151 Wis. 136, 138
N.W. 97 (1912).
48. Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 360 (1941). See also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 664 n.13 (1963) (dissenting opinion of Brennan, J.), treating the question as
"unsettled."
49. See, e.g., Leroux v. Hudson, 109 U.S. 468 (1883) ; Sharp v. Doyle, 102 U.S. 686,
690 (1881); Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866); Benchley v. Gilbert, 3
Fed. Cas. 158 (No. 1291) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1871); Ex parte Jenkins, 13 Fed. Cas. 445,
448-50 (No. 7259) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853); Williams v. McDaniel, 80 Ga. App. 614, 56
S.E.2d 926 (1949). See 4 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 300 (1843). But cf. In re Gilbert, 276 U.S.
6, after hearing, 276 U.S. 294 (1928) (original disbarment proceeding).
50. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284 (1852).
51. Id. at 287.
52. E.g., Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893), after remand, 162 U.S. 255
(1896) (assuming state court power over actions of ejectment) ; Carr v. United States,
98 U.S. 433 (1879). A number of removed cases also assume the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
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which the judgment may differ only in form from an injunction. Since Slocum
v. Mayberry,53 which sustained state court power to entertain an action of
replevin against a federal surveyor of customs, this jurisdiction at law has
been unquestioned.54 Furthermore, state court criminal jurisdiction over fed-
eral officers has always been conceded, subject, of course, to the statutory
power of federal courts to intervene by habeas corpus in cases of particular
urgency.0'
The cases rejecting state court injunction jurisdiction on constitutional
grounds, moreover, are difficult, if not impossible, to square with another line
of cases involving state court jurisdiction over national banks and other fed-
eral corporations and instrumentalities. The leading case in this category is
First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri ex rel. Barrett.5 6 The Attorney General of
Missouri brought an original proceeding in the supreme court of that state
to test the authority of the respondent national bank to establish a branch.
Under state practice, the proceeding was labeled as an information in the
nature of quo warranto. The state court held for the Attorney General and
directed the bank to close its branch on the grounds that state law prohibited
branch banking, and that federal law did not authorize it. On error, the United
States, appearing in support of the bank, urged that the state court was with-
out jurisdiction to control the actions of a federal instrumentality. Ableman
v. Booth and Tarble's Case were cited.57 The state pointed out that since Con-
gress had not given federal courts jurisdiction of proceedings of this kind
against national banks, the state courts must be open or the state's banking
laws would be unenforceable. Only three Justices agreed that Tarble's Case
barred the action. 8 The state government and courts, they thought, were
totally distinct from the national government and courts, and without power
to control them. Certainly the language of Tarble's Case supports this view.
But the Court rejected it emphatically. True, national banks were federal in-
strumentalities. But they were subject to the general laws of the state - in-
Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962) ; Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) ;
Chappell v. Waterworth, 155 U.S. 102 (1894) ; United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
53. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1 (1817). The Attorney General of the United States,
opposing the jurisdiction, cited, to no avail, In re Ferguson, 9 Johns. R. 239 (Sup. Ct.
1812), in which Chancellor Kent had denied state habeas jurisdiction over persons in fed-
eral custody. See note I supra.
54. Except, that is, for the Government's attempt to claim, mainly on the basis of
McClung and a dictum in Keely v. Sanders, 99 U.S. 441 (1879), that Slocum "cannot be
considered controlling at this date." Brief for Petitioner, p. 40 n.51, Brooks v. Dewar,
313 U.S. 354 (1941). It is worth noting that Slocum has been cited with approval as
recently as Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963). See also New Hampshire
Fire Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 362 U.S. 404, 408-09 (1960).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 6 (1906). Compare
Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
56. 263 U.S. 640 (1924).
57. Id. at 646 (argument for the United States).
58. Id. at 667 (dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Van Devanter wrote the dissenting
opinion. He was joined by Taft, C.J., and Butler, J.
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cluding those prohibiting branch banking - so long as those laws did not
contravene federal policy, as the Court held, and the dissenters assumed, they
did not. That being so, the state statute must necessarily be enforceable in
some forum,59 and since Congress had not conferred jurisdiction on federal
courts, the courts of the state had to be that forum.60
In view of all this authority recognizing state court jurisdiction, it is hard
to see why injunction cases have not been similarly treated. Indeed, in a large
number of instances, injunction jurisdiction has been assumed not to be barred
by the Constitution.61 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, for example, assumed it
when he remarked that "The object of Section 7421(a) 612 [of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954] is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal
courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of fed-
eral taxes."63 Congress, moreover, has commonly assumed that federal cor-
porations and agencies will be suable in state courts, once the bar of sovereign
immunity - which, unlike the doctrine presently being examined, prevents
suit in any court, state or federal - is removed by statute. Thus, it has pro-
vided that national banking associations "may make contracts, sue and be
sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity as fully as natural
59. "To demonstrate the binding quality of a statute but deny the power of enforce-
ment involves a fallacy made apparent by the mere statement of the proposition, for such
power is essentially inherent in the very conception of law." Id. at 660.
There is language on this page of the opinion which might indicate that the court
regarded the state court as competent to enforce only state law: "It is insisted with
great earnestness that the United States alone may inquire by quo warranto whether a
national bank is acting in excess of its charter powers, and the state is wholly without
authority to do so. This contention, will be conceded since it is plainly correct ... ." It is
submitted, however, that this language is prompted by the peculiar nature of quo war-
ranto, which is a writ running from the sovereign to one of its corporations to find out
under what authority the corporation is acting.
60. Accord, Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); Texas ex rel. Falkner v.
National Bank of Commerce, 290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961)
(on removal); Peoples Say. Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960).
But see Millard v. National Bank of Detroit, 338 Mich. 610, 61 N.W.2d 804 (1953)
(holding that state courts may enforce state law, but not federal law, against national
banks); Armand Schmoll, Inc. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 N.Y. 503, 37 N.E.2d 225
(1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 818 (1942).
61. See, e.g., Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota ex rel. Payne, 250 U.S. 163
(1919); Macleod v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 U.S. 195 (1919). The same as-
sumption must underlie injunction cases removed from state courts; see, e.g., Dugan v.
Rank, 373 U.S. 609 (1963) ; Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) ;
Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883) ; Bryant Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 Fed. 321 (5th
Cir. 1906) ; Ward v. Congress Constr. Co., 99 Fed. 598 (7th Cir. 1900) ; Sarner v. Mason,
128 F. Supp. 165 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 176 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351
U.S. 924 (1956) ; Underwood v. Dismuke, 266 Fed. 559 (D.R.I. 1920) ; City of Stanfield
v. Umatilla R. Water Users Ass'n, 192 Fed. 596 (C.C.D. Ore. 1911); Twin Falls Canal
Co. v. Foote, 192 Fed. 583 (C.C.D. Idaho 1911).
62. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a) : "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection, of any tax shall be maintained in any court."
63. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962) (dictum).
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persons." 64 And it is clear that the phrase "any court" includes state courts.6 5
Congress has, also, expressly provided that national banking associations are
not subject to "attachment, injunction, or execution ... before final judgment
in any suit, action, or proceeding, in any State, county, or municipal court."'66
Such a protective provision obviously assumes that in its absence state courts
could issue not only injunctions, but preliminary injunctions, against federal
instrumentalities - an assumption wholly at war with the notion that the
Constitution prohibits such state court jurisdiction. Any suggestion that this
argument is limited to suits involving proprietary rather than governmental
functions of federal agencies cannot stand in the face of FHA v. Burr.67 There,
a statute authorizing the Federal Housing Administrator to "sue and be sued
in any court of competent jurisdiction, State or Federal," 68 was construed to
remove the bar of sovereign immunity as to all the normal incidents of litiga-
tion, legal and equitable, including, in that particular case, garnishment.6 9
In sum, then, the decided cases on state court power to entertain proceed-
ings against federal officers are in confusion. Jurisdiction to award damages
or possession of specific property, and to punish for crime, is clear. At the
other extreme are mandamus and habeas corpus, which, whether for good
reasons or not, state courts may not grant. In the middle is injunctive relief.
Many cases assume its availability; some explicitly declare it; but most ex-
press rulings on the point deny it.70 Since no Supreme Court case squarely
deals with the point, the matter cannot be resolved purely by reference to
authority. An appeal must be made to first principles. Only by understanding
the place of the state courts in the federal system can the question of those
courts' power over federal officials be properly settled.
III. TE STATE COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM
It is easy to fall into the assumption that because federal law is supreme over
state law, state courts are somehow inferior to federal courts. This view would
regard state courts as suitable for ordinary lawsuits, but would regard federal
courts, specially constituted to hear issues of national importance, as the prop-
er forum for cases arising under federal statutes or the Constitution. How-
ever tempting such a notion is, it is alien to the main stream of thought on
federalism. Since the Constitution was signed, the state courts have been "the
64. REV. STAT. § 5136 (1875), 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1958) (emphasis supplied).
65. See Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
66. REv. STAT. § 5242 (1873), 12 U.S.C. § 91 (1958). Compare 48 Stat. 184, as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1958).
67. 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
68. 49 Stat. 722 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1958).
69. Cf. Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (1935) (attachment).
70. In addition to the cases in this group already discussed, a few recent cases under
Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86, 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (Supp. IV, 1963),
deny the jurisdiction. These cases are dealt with at notes 101-08 infra and accompanying
text.
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primary guarantors of constitutional rights." 71 The federal courts are of limit-
ed, circumscribed jurisdiction. Only the Supreme Court of the United States
has constitutional standing; all other federal courts are creatures of Congress,
and Congress need never have created them. But the state courts are reposi-
tories of general jurisdiction, conferred upon them not by Congress, but by
the sovereign people of the respective states.
These basic principles are well stated by Alexander Hamilton in Number
LXXXII of The Federalist:
I mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the course of
legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit
the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the federal
courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold
that the State courts will be divested of no part of their primitive juris-
diction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I am even of opinion
that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the
future acts of the national legislature, they will of course take cognizance
of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the
nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system.
The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or
municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation
between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are
relative to the laws of the most distant part of the globe. Those of Japan,
not less than of New York, may furnish the objects of legal discussion to
our courts. When in addition to this we consider the State governments
and the national governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred
systems, and as parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be con-
clusive, that the State courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all
cases arising under the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly
prohibited.72
That the state courts' general jurisdiction extends, in the usual case, to
cases arising under federal law, including the federal Constitution, is even more
obvious when it is recalled that otherwise there would be no court competent
to decide a large and important class of cases. Before 1875, as is well known,
federal courts had no original jurisdiction over cases arising under the federal
laws or Constitution. Such cases got into federal trial courts, by and large,
only if the parties happened to be of diverse citizenship. Even now, when
federal courts do have original "federal-question" jurisdiction,73 the state
courts are still essential to decide cases arising under federal law that do not
involve the $10,000 jurisdictional amount required by Congress, to say nothing
of cases arising under state law in which a federal law defense is asserted.
71. HAXT & WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL. SS STz 339
(1953).
72. 2 THE FEnRAusT 130, 132 (Bourne ed. 1901). This passage is a locus classicus
of federalism. The Supreme Court has repeatedly approved it. See Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 n.5 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 138
(1877); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 25-26 (1820).
73. 18 Stat. 470 (1875), 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1958).
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The very statute74 that gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
state courts assumes in terms that state courts have power to decide federal
questions, including questions of the constitutionality of federal statutes, for
it expressly provides a different mode of review (appeal instead of certiorari)
for state court decisions invalidating federal laws.
Not only are state courts the only courts competent to try many federal law
cases, but also, as Hamilton pointed out, state court power in such cases is
not negated ipso facto when Congress decides to delegate jurisdiction over
them to federal courts of first instance. If the question of whether Congress,
in conferring that jurisdiction upon its own courts, has taken away any of the
state courts' pre-existing general judicial power was not irrevocably settled
by Hamilton, the answer has been clear since the striking case of Houston v.
Afoore. 5 Houston, a member of the Pennsylvania militia, had been summoned
to federal service by order of the President. He disobeyed the summons and
did not appear to serve, thus violating federal law and subjecting himself to
a money penalty prescribed by federal law. He was tried and convicted of this
offense by a state court-martial. His property was levied on and sold, and the
fine thus collected was paid into the Treasury of the United States. Houston
then brought trespass against the marshal who had seized and sold his prop-
erty. He argued that only a federal court could try him for a federal military
crime, and presented a very strong case for holding against state court juris-
diction. Not only did the case involve the military, an area of special federal
concern, but the state court had also run directly counter to the maxim that
the courts of one sovereign cannot enforce the criminal laws of another.
76
In spite of these weighty considerations, the Supreme Court, in a strong
opinion, upheld the jurisdiction of the state court-martial. The Court first dis-
posed of the argument that since a state legislature may not make laws regu-
lating the conduct of federal soldiers, state courts may not enforce such laws.
That contention, the Court showed, was based on the notion that whenever a
court of, say, Pennsylvania, made a decision, it must be applying the laws of
Pennsylvania. Hamilton 77 had already exploded that fallacy, and the Supreme
Court now proceeded to do so too:
Admit, that the legislature of Pennsylvania could not constitutionally
legislate in respect to delinquent militia-men, and prescribe the punish-
ment to which they should be subject, had the state court-martial juris-
diction over the subject, so as to enforce the laws of Congress against
these delinquents? This, it will be seen, is a different question from that
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1958) (derived from § 25 of the judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat.
73).
75. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
76. If this maxim ever had any force in the federal system, it did not survive Ten-
nessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) (federal court may try state criminal charge against
federal official on removal). Cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state courts not only
may, but must, enforce federal civil-penalty statute) ; see also Note, State Enforcement
of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (1960).
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 was approved and relied on by the Court. 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) at 25-26.
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which has been just examined. That respects the power of a state legis-
lature to legislate upon a subject, on which Congress has declared its
will. This concerns the jurisdiction of a state military tribunal to adjudi-
cate in a case which depends on a law of Congress, and to enforce it.
7 8
There being no inherent disability barring state-court enforcement of federal
laws, the Court next held, relying on Hamilton, that Congress's delegation of
jurisdiction to a federal court-martial had not ousted the state court of juris-
diction. This resolution, the Court concluded, was confirmed by the practice
of Congress. For the first Judiciary Act 79 carefully marked out certain classes
of cases, including crimes, that should be exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts, "showing that, in the opinion of that body [the
First Congress], it was not sufficient to vest an exclusive jurisdiction, where
it was deemed proper, merely by a grant of jurisdiction generally."8 0 Since
military crimes were not within the first Judiciary Act, and since the statute
giving to federal courts-martial cognizance of such crimes said nothing about
exclusivity, it followed that the Pennsylvania court-martial had jurisdiction.8'
This decision was no mere aberration. True, it was not unanimous: Mr.
Justice Story, joined by another, unnamed Justice, dissented.8 2 He thought
Article III of the Constitution compelled Congress to delegate all the classes
of cases therein named to some federal court, and forbade, ex proprio vigore,
state court jurisdiction of certain types of federal law cases, including crimes
- propositions that have not stood the test of time. Mr. Justice Johnson con-
curred separately, after admitting that "It is not very easy to form a distinct
idea of what the question in this case really is."8 And Mr. Justice Washing-
ton, who wrote the majority opinion, noted that not all of the other three
Justices "concur in all respects in the reasons which influence my opinion."
8 4
But whether or not the reasoning relied on had the complete concurrence of
the four Justices who made up the majority in Houston v. Moore, the doc-
trine of that case has been so constantly reaffirmed by the Court - most re-
cently in 1962 85 - that it can no longer be doubted. As the Court said in
Robb v. Connolly:
Upon the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests the
obligation to- guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance
78. Id. at 24.
79. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
80. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 26.
81. Houston v. Moore is by no means the only instance of state courts' enforcing
federal criminal laws. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38
H. v. L. REv. 545 (1925).
82. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 47, 76.
83. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 32.
84. Ibid.
85. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 508 n.5 (1962) (referring
expressly to pp. 25-27 of 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.), the heart of the reasoning of Washington,
J.).
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thereof, whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding be-
fore them.""
In the light of these ancient and never discarded propositions, the notion of
Tarble's Case that state and federal governments and courts are strangers to
each other cannot be justified. In our federal system, the two sovereignties
have their distinct powers and limitations. But all the courts of this nation,
federal and state, are open to enforce those limitations and aid those powers,
in cases that come within their jurisdiction as defined by the power, federal or
state, that created them. Federal and state law are inseparable parts of one
system of jurisprudence, binding alike on all persons within the boundaries of
any given state.8 7 "[T]his theory and practice," said Chief Justice White,
is but an expression of the principles underlying the Constitution and
which cause the governments and courts of both the Nation and the sev-
eral States not to be strange or foreign to each other in the broad sense of
the word, but to be all courts of a common country, all within the orbit
of their lawful authority being charged with the duty to safeguard and
enforce the right of every citizen without reference to the particular ex-
ercise of governmental power from which the right may have arisen, if
only the authority to enforce such right comes generally within the scope
of the jurisdiction conferred by the government creating them.88
For a state court, accordingly, to order a federal official to act according to
federal law, or to obey valid state law that Congress has not displaced, is no
usurpation, nor any assertion that state courts are superior to federal courts
or federal officials. It is rather an assertion of the supremacy of law, and
especially of federal law.89
In fact, it is the supremacy clause itself, so confidently relied on by Able-
man v. Booth, Tarble's Case, and various commentators 90 in opposing state-
court jurisdiction, that conclusively demonstrates the contrary. That clause
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
86. 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1834). Accord, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404 (1959) ;
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 479 (1936) ; Galveston,
H. & S.A. MR. v. Wallace, 223 U.S. 481, 490-91 (1912). Robb, it should be noted, ex-
pressly distinguished Ablentan v. Booth and Tarble's Case. But the Court's conservatism
in thus declining to cast doubt upon its own precedents must not be allowed to obscure
the fact that the governing principle of Robb squarely rejects the assumptions on which
Ablenan and Tarble rest.
87. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1877).
8S. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 222 (1916).
89. Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 403 n.11 (1963).
90. See Comment, Power of a State Court to Enjoin National Labor Relations Board
Officials, 36 MIcH. L. REv. 1344 (1938) ; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference,
43 HARv. L. REV. 345, 348-58 (1930); Bishop, The Jurisdiction of State and Federal
Courts Over Federal Officers, 9 CoLum. L. REv. 397, 407 (1909).
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any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding. 91
The clause, significantly, is directly addressed to state judges: they are bound
by the Constitution, and must enforce it. They are also bound by valid federal
law, and if in a suit against an official of the federal government an authority
validly conferred by that Government is asserted as a defense, they must honor
it. But the supremacy clause demands, not that any federal law be automati-
cally enforced by state judges, until invalidated by a federal court, as Tarble's
Case suggests, but that state judges apply federal laws "made in Pursuance"
of the Constitution. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said in Marbury v. Madi-
son,92 "not the laws of the United States, generally, but those only which shall
be made in pursuance of the constitution," are the supreme law of the land. 3
And, since it "is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is," 94 it follows that state courts are not only per-
mitted, but obligated, to examine the validity of federal authority asserted in
cases before them. Nor can reverence for official authority bar state court
examination of federal agents' actions. For in our system of government no
official, high or low, is solutus legibus, like the Roman emperors.9 5 All are
under the law and subject to its paramount obligation.
How, then, can state court jurisdiction to control federal officials be doubted?
If it is feared that injunctions are too drastic an interference with the work-
ings of the federal government, why is not the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
which bars relief against the Government and, in circumstances in which the
relief prayed will seriously interfere with governmental functions, against its
officers, a sufficient protection? If it is feared that state courts will, perhaps
deliberately, refuse to honor the defense of sovereign immunity and other fed-
eral law defenses, the answer is that Congress has provided a whole arsenal
of protective weapons against such state action. Apart from appellate review
in the Supreme Court, which has been criticized as too slow, every federal
official sued civilly or criminally in a state court on account of an official act
has the right of removal to a federal forum,96 and if he is imprisoned by state
authorities, the federal courts will release him on habeas corpus if the case is
of urgent federal concern.9 7 Finally, Congress can always make federal court
jurisdiction exclusive by special statutory provision, thus cutting off state
91. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
92. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803).
93. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (Marshall,
C.J.) : "The States have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden,
or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress."
(Emphasis supplied.)
94. Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
95. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803) (Secre-
tary of State).
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1958).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1958).
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court power to proceed even against those federal officials who do not want
a federal forum and would not use their right of removal.98
There remains the objection that in spite of the technical and doctrinal
plausibility of state court jurisdiction to enjoin federal officials, 99 those officials
are just too important to be left to the mercy of state judges. This appears to
have been the feeling of the federal courts about state court obstruction of the
Fugitive Slave Acts. It is not hard to think of modern analogues. The feeling
is very likely behind cases like Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers.10 ° The At-
torney General of the United States applied to the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Alabama for an order permitting him, by
authority of Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960,101 to inspect voting
records in the possession of the Board of Registrars of Montgomery County,
Alabama. The defendant Board moved to dismiss and counterclaimed for an
injunction against the enforcement of Title III, on the ground of the uncon-
stitutionality of that statute. In the meantime, the Attorney General of Ala-
bama sued the Attorney General of the United States in a state court, and
obtained from that court a temporary injunction against the enforcement of
the federal statute, also on the ground of unconstitutionality. The federal At-
torney General then removed the state court suit to the Middle District of
Alabama, where his own case was pending. He moved the district court to
dissolve the injunction and dismiss the state court suit. The district court
granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed on the lower court's
opinion.
A number of sufficient grounds can be thought of for this decision. The best
is that Title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960 is clearly constitutional, so
98. It could, for example, be provided that the jurisdiction of three-judge district
courts to enjoin the enforcement of federal statutes on the ground of unconstitutionality,
28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958), shall be exclusive of state courts. Arguably, Congress, in creat-
ing a special forum, intended - though it did not, as is customary, say so - that the
three-judge courts have exclusive jurisdiction (a case, in other words, of implied exclu-
sivity). I do not find that such an argument has ever been made. In any event, it would
explain only cases decided since 1937, when § 2282 was enacted, and it would also re-
quire that state courts be held to have lost jurisdiction to enjoin the enforcement of state
statutes on the ground of repugnance to the federal Constitution (an unheard-of prop-
osition), since Congress has provided special three-judge district courts for that class of
cases as well, 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958).
99. In addition to the authorities already cited, it is worth noting that Professor
Moore believes that "justice and sound federalism" support the jurisdiction as a general
proposition. 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE II 0.6[5], at 251 (2d ed. 1961). Compare Note,
Limitations on State Judicial Interference with Federal Activities, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 84
(1951) ; Note, 55 HAmv. L. REv. 674 (1942), each of which argues that there should be
jurisdiction, or not, according as each particular case affects federal interests - in other
words, that jurisdiction should depend upon a particularistic case-by-case analysis. That
kind of solution may be academically satisfying, but questions of power and jurisdiction
deserve something closer to bright-line answers.
100. 187 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Ala. 1960), aff'd per curiam sub norn. Dinkens v. At-
torney General, 285 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 913 (1961).
101. 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (Supp. IV, 1963).
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that the state court injunction is simply erroneous on the merits. Furthermore,
the state court suit was a clear attempt on the part of the state voting officials
to evade the federal forum already chosen by the plaintiff federal Attorney
General. Those officials' opportunity to defend the federal court suit was a
fully adequate one for assertion of their constitutional claims. But the decision
went beyond these grounds. It added that the state court lacked jurisdiction
because its injunction was "in violation of the basic legal principle that state
courts are without jurisdiction to review the discretion or enjoin the acts of
federal officers."'1 2 Tarble's Case and Keely v. Sanders were cited for this
sweeping proposition. This formulation has a new element, it will be observed;
it refers to state courts' inability "to review the discretion . . . of federal
officers."'1 3 If the court meant only that state courts may not say that the
Attorney General ought to have asked to see the votings records of one county
rather than another, it was surely right. But then, federal courts could not do
that either. If it meant that the Attorney General had "discretion" to gain
access to the voting records even if the statute he invoked were unconstitu-
tional, its conclusion must be questioned. The context indicates that the latter
meaning was intended.
Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers has been followed in two later cases." 4
In one of these, 05 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited a new
authority alleged to preclude state court injunction jurisdiction - Bowles v.
Willingham.10 6 But this case held simply that Congress could give the federal
courts, by express enactment, exclusive jurisdiction of certain cases arising
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,107 and that Congress had
further authorized federal courts, as an exception to the general prohibition
of federal court injunctions against state court proceedings, 08 to protect this
exclusivity by injunction. The precise holding of Bowles was that a federal
district court could, and should, enjoin a state court suit itself seeking to en-
102. 187 F. Supp. at 852.
103. The court cited Rogers v. Calumet Nat'l Bank, 358 U.S. 331 (1959) (per
curiam), a one page opinion, rendered without argument, in which the Supreme Court
did indeed say that "a state court is without power to review the discretion exercised by
the Attorney General of the United States under federal law." The case involved the
Attorney General's actions as Alien Property Custodian. The meaning of this holding,
however, is quite different from the construction, put upon it by the District Court in
Alabama ex rel. Gallion v. Rogers, as is shown by the Supreme Court's citation of Sile-
sian-American Corp. v. Markham, 156 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1946), aff'd, 332 U.S. 469
(1947), in which it was held that Congress had delegated to the President, and the
President to the Alien Property Custodian, absolute power, unreviewable by the courts,
to choose what alien property to seize, and that these delegations were constitutional.
Federal as well as state courts are thus covered by the principle embodied in Calmnet
Nat'l Bank, supra.
104. Kennedy v. Bruce, 298 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Alabama ex rel. Patterson v.
Jones, 189 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
105. Kennedy v. Bruce, srupra note 104.
106. 321 U.S. 503, 511-12 (1944).
107. 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
108. See 62 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958).
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join the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration from issuing cer-
tain rent orders under the Emergency Price Control Act. The clear assump-
tion of the case is that but for the special protective federal statutes around
which the opinion is built, the state court would have had general jurisdic-
tion of the injunction suit.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the heart both of the cases denying injunction jurisdiction and of Tar-
ble's Case and Ableman is the notion that since federal law is supreme over
state law, the state courts are therefore incompetent to make a decision based
on federal law. Since the supremacy clause forbids the state legislatures to
make laws on matters which the federal government has legitimately under-
taken to control, it is reasoned that the principles of dual sovereignty
would also forbid state courts from hailing federal officers before them and
giving them explicit directions under the guise of interpreting federal law.
The basic assumption of this line of reasoning, that a state court may apply
only state law, is, as we have seen, false. State courts are not only competent
to apply federal law, but in many instances are the only courts available in
which federal law can be enforced. The remaining argument, that for reasons
of comity state courts ought to leave the governing of federal officers to the
federal courts, ignores the already extensive jurisdiction of state courts over
federal officers, and the unique position of the state courts as the only courts
of general jurisdiction in the federal system.
It might be suggested that the existing precedents can be rationalized on
the theory that state courts have "law" jurisdiction over federal officials (re-
plevin, damages), but not "equity" jurisdiction (injunctions, mandamus),1° 9
Judgments at law, the argument would run, are less of an interference with
the functioning of the federal government. Habeas corpus, involving as it does
a particularly striking form of interference, would, in this view, be classified
with the "equity" cases. Apart from the fact that this suggested rationale
exalts form over substance - a replevin judgment, for example, may in prac-
tice be the equivalent of an injunction - it fails to give full application to the
underlying principle that state courts as well as federal have a duty to enforce
the limitations that federal law imposes on federal officials. The law-equity
distinction, furthermore, has the additional weakness that it fails to explain
state court criminal jurisdiction over federal officers - a jurisdiction poten-
tially productive of the most drastic interference of all. The impact of this
criminal jurisdiction has not, perhaps, been great, since federal officers have
the protection of removal 110 and federal habeas corpus.11 But its undoubted
existence is inconsistent with the suggested law-equity distinction.
109. Mandamus is not, of course, historically an equitable writ. It is a prerogative
writ issuable out of the Court of King's Bench, a law court. But it may be classified as
equitable for present purposes because its effect is similar to that of an injunction.
110. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
111. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1889).
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Thus, reason and the basic principles of our federal system compel the con-
clusion that state courts have power to issue injunctions against federal offi-
cials. The force of the foregoing reasoning would also lead to the conclusion
that state courts may issue habeas corpus and mandamus against those offi-
cials. I, for one, would cheerfully accept such a conclusion, as it would wipe
from the books a body of demonstrably unsound doctrine. In any event, the
mandamus area is hardly of present importance, since that writ can be sup-
planted entirely by the mandatory injunction. As for any ills thought to derive
from state court habeas corpus review of federal detention, Congress can
fashion whatever remedy is necessary. In advocating the existence of such
jurisdiction, however, I do not wish to be understood as countenancing its
indiscriminate use or abuse. Considerations of comity and of deference to
federal policy will often dictate restraint on the part of the state courts. And
the Supreme Court, which will of course sit in judgment over the state courts'
exercise of their jurisdiction over federal officials, will be able to develop
decisional rules particularizing the instances in which, as a matter of comity,
state courts should abstain.
As long as federal officials have their present broad right of removal, adop-
tion of the position advocated in this article would have only a limited prac-
tical effect. It would probably not increase the instances in which state courts
actually grant relief against federal officials. It would, however, have the
derivative effect of opening the federal courts to many plaintiffs who are now
without a remedy. This effect would in itself be of great importance, since it
would increase the extent to which federal rights are protected against the
federal bureaucracy. Of course, the existing broad right of removal is not
necessarily permanent. Congress gave it only in 1948, and Congress can take
it away.
In a commendable desire to enforce federal law, and under provocation from
state courts whose respect for federal law is not what it should be, some fed-
eral courts have from time to time succumbed to temptation and announced
that state courts lack power to issue injunctions against federal officials. In
fairness, the federal courts cannot be censured too severely. State courts who
issue injunctions as freely as the Alabama county court did in the Gallinn,
case are only bringing federal retaliation on themselves. They are as much,
if not more, at fault as federal courts who sweepingly deny state jurisdiction.
But one doubts that the vindication of federal policy requires distortion of
fundamental federalist principles. After all, means are important as well as
ends, and the day may come again when the state courts are called upon to
enforce the Constitution in cases where the federal courts are powerless. In
the long run, it will be the part of wisdom to heed the words of the first
justice Harlan in Minnesota v. Brundage:
It cannot be assumed that the state court will hesitate to enforce any right
secured . . . by [the federal Constitution] . . . ; for upon them equally
with the courts of the Union rests the duty to maintain the supreme law
of the land.
1 12
112. 180 U.S. 499, 503 (1901).
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